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Transparency and Fairness in Organizational Decisions:  
An Experimental Investigation using the Paired Ultimatum Game 
Abstract 
 
Organizations often keep secret their decisions about what employees receive (e.g., salary, 
budgets, benefits) to manage fairness concerns. We propose that this can be counter-
productive because of a mechanism we call the “escalation of deservingness under 
secrecy”, where the existence of peers can inflate one’s own sense of deservingness, even 
when the actual allocations to peers are unknown. Building on the ultimatum game, we 
developed a Paired Ultimatum Game (PUG) in which a player and a peer respondent 
engage with the same offeror simultaneously but with no direct competition between 
respondents. Across three experiments- a live interaction study as well as two scenario 
studies- using the PUG, we analyze the conditions under which transparency may be better 
than secrecy in preventing the escalation of deservingness perceptions.  
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Introduction 
 
Behavioral strategy research recognizes that individuals in organizations view the 
fairness of decisions that affect their pay, career opportunities, budgets and bonuses against 
the backdrop of what their peers receive (e.g., Zenger, 1994; Nickerson & Zenger, 2008; 
Larkin, Pierce & Gino, 2012; Lee & Puranam, 2017; Gartenberg & Wulf, 2017). 
Organizations often adopt policies that may restrict the visibility of such resource 
allocation decisions (Gely & Bierman, 2003; Colella, Paetzold, Zardkoohi & Wesson, 2007; 
Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). The key premise underlying a policy of secrecy is that it 
prevents comparisons of receivers’ allocations with those of their peers. Such comparisons 
can engender envy and conflict, dishonesty, perceptions of unfairness, and loss of privacy 
(Colella et al., 2007; Larkin et al., 2012; John, Loewenstein & Rick, 2014; Bamberger & 
Belogolovsky, 2017) that may indeed be detrimental to organizational outcomes. 
However, the theory and evidence for the effectiveness of secrecy-based regimes 
remains inconclusive in behavioral strategy research. Although there is evidence that pay 
secrecy is negatively related to task performance (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; 
Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014) and employee mutual helping (Bamberger & 
Belogolovsky, 2017), these findings are not unequivocal. There is also evidence that shows 
that pay secrecy is positively related to market performance and discretionary behaviors 
(Tremblay & Chênevert, 2008; see Colella et al., 2007 for a review of costs and benefits of 
pay secrecy). As a result, an understanding of how secrecy versus transparency may impact 
organizational outcomes is important. Furthermore, pay disclosure may impact key 
organizational outcomes like performance and cooperation among organizational agents. 
The choice of secrecy versus transparency of allocations thus becomes a key design 
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parameter for organizational designers, as it can affect productivity and ultimately 
organizational performance.     
In this paper, we investigate a specific theoretical mechanism that pertains to 
fairness concerns about allocations made under secrecy. In doing so, we attempt to explain 
the pattern of mixed results on the effects of secrecy on organizational performance. The 
mechanism we propose builds on the research that shows that implicit comparisons with 
peers do not cease simply because the outcomes of those peers are unknown (Belogolovsky 
& Bamberger, 2014; Ho & Su, 2009). As a result, even under conditions of secrecy, people 
may escalate perceptions of what is considered a fair allocation to oneself. This Escalation 
of Deservingness under Secrecy (EDS) as a theoretical mechanism offers a potential 
explanation not only for why but also when secrecy may be preferable to transparency in 
organizational decisions. 
To be clear, EDS may not be the only possible mechanism through which secrecy 
can have adverse organizational consequences. Other mechanisms could include a 
weakened perceptual link between pay and performance, or a general sense of distrust in 
the organization’s procedures and practices (e.g., Colella et al., 2007; Belogovsky & 
Bamberger, 2014). We believe EDS merits independent consideration as it has the potential 
to parsimoniously explain both why secrecy can lower motivation (without additional 
assumptions about pay-for-performance or organizational justice perceptions) as well as 
the conditions under which it can still be better than transparency. It also has practical 
implications. In choosing between a policy of secrecy versus transparency, the organization 
designer must estimate the extent of EDS and compare it to the impact of transparently 
unequal offers on recipient’s perception of deservingness. Consider a simple organization 
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with one hierarchical superior and two peers: ego and alter. As long as ego’s own view of 
what she deserves (when the amount offered to peer is secret) is smaller than the actual 
amount that the peer is receiving, then keeping the payments secret is better from the 
superior’s perspective, else transparency is better.  
Since we wish to test a specific theoretical mechanism, we conducted laboratory 
experiments (also see Bamberger & Belogovsky, 2010, 2017). Such experiments have the 
advantage of producing causal inference about an abstract mechanism without the need for 
numerous controls. However, experimental evidence cannot claim to reproduce real-world 
phenomena. Rather, they help to establish the empirical plausibility of the theorized 
mechanism under investigation as a sufficient explanation.  
In adopting this approach, we build on the tradition of prior work that has sought 
to examine important organizational issues through controlled experiments in the 
laboratory (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2012; Burton & Obel, 1988; Cyert & March, 1963; 
Guetzkow & Simon, 1955; Lanaj, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Barnes & Harmon, 2013; Malhotra 
& Murnighan, 2002; Reitzig & Maciejovsky, 2015; Raveendran, Puranam & Warglien, 
2015). We find support across three experiments for our central theoretical prediction that 
uncertainty about offers to others may lead to perceptions of unfairness and therefore 
lowers willingness to accept offers to self. Our findings have the potential to shed light on 
a theoretical mechanism underlying the effects of secrecy and stimulate further research 
into these processes in field data. An important caveat in this regard is that our experiments 
do not feature any effort (or performance outcomes) by the recipients of resources, making 
direct comparisons to organizational situations untenable. Rather, we set up a simple but 
abstract situation in which there are no ex-ante plausible differences in deservingness 
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across recipients. Hence, we can study the effect of transparency or secrecy on their 
perceptions of what they think of as a fair allocation to themsleves.  
Fairness Perceptions under Secrecy & Transparency  
According to equity theory, people experience inequity if they perceive that 
rewards are not proportional to deservingness for everybody within a reference group 
(Adams, 1965). However, the tendency for people to be overconfident (e.g., Moore & 
Healy, 2008) can exaggerate the perception of one’s own deservingness. As Larkin, Pierce, 
and Gino (2012) note, this can explain why employees are likely to see inequality as 
inequity when they receive less (Martin, 1982; Zenger, 1994), but may not perceive 
inequity when they receive more than others (Fershtman, Gneezy & List, 2012). To the 
extent that perceptions of inequity cause employee behavior that is harmful to the 
organization (e.g., shirking, sabotage, conflict), keeping allocation decisions secret may be 
beneficial to the organization.  
However, even when allocations to peers are unknown, peer social comparisons 
will continue to operate simply because peers exist (Festinger, 1954) and are identifiable 
(Haran & Ritov, 2014). This is why altering the salient reference group is an organization 
design solution to the problem of social comparison and envy (Nickerson and Zenger, 
2008).  Under conditions of secrecy, in which allocations to peers are unknown, employees 
still make conjectures about what their peers receive to determine how much they should 
receive if inequity is to be avoided. Such conjectures may be inaccurate, with employees 
over- or underestimating what their peers receive. The implications for the fairness of over- 
versus under- estimating allocations to peers are not the same. If receiving less than a peer 
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is far less desirable than receiving more, it may be prudent for an employee to ask for more 
than what one would typically ask for in the absence of a peer, all else being equal.  
To illustrate our argument, consider a scenario in which a reward of $8 with a total 
utility of 10 units is acceptable to an individual in the absence of a peer. The same $8 
reward when a peer is present should confer less utility because of the possibility that the 
peer receives a reward of more than $8, as well as the disutility from this outcome. We 
believe this is likely because of the robust empirical regularity that individuals experience 
significant disutility from perceived inequity (e.g. Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Ho & Su, 2009), 
coupled with the general tendency of loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Together 
these imply that in the absence of any information about offers to others, the disutility from 
possibly receiving less than others should in general outweigh the utility from possibly 
receiving more (Fliessbach et al., 2012; Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer & Doherty, 2012). To 
compensate, the absolute amount of the reward expected by the individual should rise to a 
value greater than $8. This is the escalation of what one deserves under secrecy (EDS), 
which occurs even when the offeror may be offering in reality the same amount ($8) to 
both recipients. Note that we did not assume any other sources of differences in 
deservingness here, such as those based on the performance or efforts of the employees. 
Just the mere presence of a peer (who is receiving an unknown allocation) should inflate 
the notion of what is considered fair in an interaction with a superior. 
Lawler’s early work (1965) provides some face validity, although not rigorous 
evidence for our argument. He reported that managers over-estimated their peer and 
subordinate’s pay when pay was secret. EDS does not require this over-estimation but 
would certainly be strengthened by it. To the best of our knowledge, the implication of this 
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for one’s perception of a desired allocation to self has neither been stated nor tested before 
(see also Colella et al.’s (2007) argument suggesting this is a promising yet unpursued line 
of research). This argument leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: Perceptions of the allocation one deserves are higher in the presence of a peer 
whose allocation is a secret, compared to the case where there is no peer.  
EDS implies that uncertainty about secret offers to others is a potential source of 
perceptions of unfairness (even if the actual offers are equitable), which therefore lower 
willingness to accept. An important corollary of EDS therefore is that when offers to peers 
are transparent and seen to be equitable, people should perceive such situations as fairer 
than the cases where the offers to peers are secret (a de-escalation of deservingness under 
transparency). The reasoning for this assertion follows the same logic as for EDS. 
Individuals derive utility from both the monetary value of the allocation they receive and 
the equity they perceive with reference to their peers. Increasing the equity perceived with 
reference to peers can allow for a decline in the monetary value of the allocation, thus 
keeping the overall level of equity produced by the offer unchanged. In other words, when 
peers transparently receive an allocation that seems fair relative to oneself, individuals may 
be willing to accept a smaller absolute allocation and still perceive it to be fair. 
For instance, if a reward of $8 with a total utility of 10 units is acceptable to an 
individual when no peer is present, then an offer of 10 units of total utility should also be 
acceptable to him when a peer is present. If this individual receives a positive utility of 2 
units from an equitable parallel reward to the peer (cf Van den Bos et al, 1998), then the 
utility from the reward itself (and possibly that from the equity relative to the offeror of 
that reward) can be as low as 8 units and still be as acceptable as a reward that produces 10 
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total utility units in the absence of a peer. It is thus reasonable to expect an increase in 
willingness to accept offers when transparent and equal offers are made to peers relative to 
the case in which offers to peers are secret. This change in perception of what a fair 
allocation to self is under transparency leads us to the second hypothesis: 
H2: Willingness to accept an allocation increases in the presence of a peer who is 
known to be receiving an equal allocation, compared to the case where the same allocation 
to the peer is secret.   
To the best of our knowledge, these hypotheses have not been directly examined to 
date. However, in research testing the existence of peer-induced equity considerations, Ho 
and Su (2009) did collect relevant data using ultimatum games (UGs). When we reanalyzed 
their data, we found evidence consistent with our Hypothesis 2. Offers of 10% or less were 
accepted 43% of the time by the players in their UGs as long as they believe another player 
to be receiving a comparable offer. This outcome is in stark contrast to the overwhelmingly 
high rejection rates found in simple UG when offers are below 20% (Sanfey, Rilling, 
Aronson, Nystrom & Cohen, 2003). However, Ho and Su’s (2009) evidence is indicative 
rather than conclusive for our Hypothesis 2 because they did not randomly assign offer 
values to peers or cover the range of possible offers, as testing this hypothesis was not the 
primary objective of their study. Their study also did not cover Hypothesis 1. Therefore, 
the impetus on us was to formally design a study to test both hypotheses. 
Study Paradigm - Paired Ultimatum Game 
We used a three-party version of the Ultimatum Game (Ho & Su, 2009) that we 
call the Paired Ultimatum Game (PUG) as the primary paradigm to test our hypotheses. 
The UG and its variants are widely used to study concepts such as fairness, costly 
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punishments, gift-giving, and power (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Wang et al., 2011). In 
the UG, one player (the offeror) begins with an endowment of a given amount (e.g., $5). 
The offeror proposes a division of the endowment amount (e.g., $2 out of $5), and the 
respondent decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, the 
endowment is split as proposed (i.e., $2 to respondent, $3 to offeror); if it is not, both 
players get nothing (i.e., $0 to both). Studies show that most respondents who are offered 
less than 20% of a total amount choose to reject those offers, with the rejection rate 
increasing as respondent shares become smaller (Oosterbeek, Sloof & Van De Kuilen, 
2004; Sanfey et al., 2003).  
Our goal is to understand how the introduction of a peer affects a respondent’s 
perceptions of what constitutes a fair offer. To rule out any considerations of competition 
with the peer and focus purely on fairness related issues, a non-competing peer is 
operationalized as a peer respondent whose actions do not influence the allocation outcome 
of the focal respondent, even if both are dealing with the same offeror.  
<Insert Figure 1 About Here> 
Accordingly, in PUG, one offeror makes two separate and simultaneous offers to 
two respondents; R1 and R2 (see Figure 1). The endowment to offeror is the same across 
both pairs of offers to the two respondents (e.g., $5 to be split between offeror and R1, and 
$5 to be split between offeror and R2), but the outcome of the game between offeror and 
R1 does not affect the outcome of the game between offeror and R2. Finally, the offeror 
receives the average payoff of the two games. Therefore, the magnitude of the maximum 
payoff that an offeror and respondents can receive in PUG is the same as that in UG.  
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To give a more analytical version of the reasoning for our two hypotheses in the 
context of UG and PUG: consider that a responder receives utility of ]1,0[x from an 
allocation of x when no peer is present (UG), and utility of x-where  when a 
peer who is receiving an unknown amount is present (PUG).  While the respondent 
would like to receive as high a value of x as possible, let the probability of actually 
receiving such allocation from the offeror be (1-x). The situation is symmetric for any 
peer respondent in PUG, though the value of may differ. While there is no material 
interdependence between respondents (because offers come from different buckets), our 
context bears a resemblance to auctions in the sense of one respondent winning when 
other loses. This resemblance is however a superficial one. In a sealed bid second price or 
first price auction, the value to self is fixed, and bidding strategy is common knowledge. 
Neither is true in our case. When the actual offers (and perceptions of what other 
respondents consider fair allocation to be) are unknown, the respondents cannot reach an 
equilibrium in “best response” to each other.  
However, each respondent wants to ensure getting more than the other, and so 
escalates their perceptions of their own deservingness up to the point where the 
diminished probability of receiving this offer makes further escalation sub-optimal. 
Therefore, the respondents can reach an equilibrium with respect to the offeror in terms 
of how much they can expect and receive. There is an equilibrium in what the respondent 
expects and what the offeror allocates at x=1/2 in UG and x= (1+in PUG. The second 
is larger than the first as long as (disutility from secret offer to peer exists), which is 
our first hypothesis.  A non-negative utility from transparent and equal offer to peers 
corresponds to a case where ≤In this case, it is easy to see that the utility of a given 
 11 
 
 
offer in PUG is likely to be higher (and the equilibrium values of offers and perceptions 
of a fair allocation are lower) with a transparent offer to peer, relative to the case of a 
secret offer to peer. That is our second hypothesis. In the Technical Appendix, we give 
more generalized versions of these results.  
Ethics Statement 
 The authors sought and obtained approval of the Institutional Review Boards at one 
of their institutions for each of the studies. All participants had to be 18 years of age and 
above. In Experiment 1, one set of responses was removed as one of the participants did 
not meet the age criterion. All participants were briefed about the procedures of the 
experiment and had given their written consent before participating in the experiment. The 
written consent forms were stored as required by the Institutional Review Boards. All 
participants recruited from a student research pool in Experiment 2, on Prolific in 
Experiment 3, and on Amazon Mechanical Turk for supplementary studies read the 
procedures of the experiments and gave their consent by clicking on the appropriate option 
before participating in the experiments (see Table 1 for roadmap of experiments). 
<Insert Table 1 About Here> 
Experiment 1 
In our first experiment, we tested our first hypothesis that the mere presence of a 
(non-competing) peer, even in the absence of any information on the offer to the peer, 
inflates the respondent’s perception of a fair offer to self. To measure perceptions of what 
constitutes a fair offer to self, we relied on the strategy method in UG (see, for example, 
Mitzkewitz & Nagel, 1993; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999; see Bahry & Wilson, 2006 for a 
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discussion on why the strategy method may be useful in assessing respondent behaviors; 
also see Brandts & Charness, 2011 for a review on direct response versus strategy method), 
which elicits minimum acceptable offers (MAOs) reported by respondents before they 
knew what was actually being offered. Simultaneously, offerors were asked to report their 
proposed offers before they knew the MAOs of respondents. 
Participants 
We recruited one hundred and sixty-six undergraduate students (92 male, 71 female 
and 3 did not report gender) with an average age of 18.7 years from an engineering 
institution in India. Participants enrolled in the study voluntarily. They were aware that 
they could earn a monetary reward depending on the outcomes of their actions in the study. 
As we had no prior information to estimate the effect size, we targeted 60 participants 
(offerors and respondents) in each condition. Eventually, we had between 52 and 60 
participants in each condition due to attrition between sign-up and show-up.  
Study Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (UG, PUG 
Unaware, PUG Aware described below) to play a 10-round ultimatum game with the 
strategy method (Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999, see Appendix 1 for full instructions). 
Participants were further randomly assigned to be either an offeror or a respondent. Each 
participant played the same role in all ten rounds and interacted with the same counterpart. 
The study was conducted in three seminar rooms – one for offerors, and two for 
respondents. For each experimental session, all participants were in the same condition. In 
the first session, the experimenters divided participants across two rooms. Participants were 
given instructions and role information in each room; all participants in room one were 
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given information sheets for Offerors in UG condition, while those in room two were given 
information sheets for Respondents in UG condition. In the second session, the 
experimenters divided participants across three rooms. Participants in room one were given 
information sheets for Offerors in PUG unaware condition, and participants in rooms two 
and three were given information sheets for Respondent in PUG unaware condition. The 
same process was repeated in the third session, with participants in room one receiving 
information sheets for Offerors in PUG aware condition, and participants in rooms two and 
three were given information sheets for Respondent in PUG aware condition.1 Participants 
were not aware of who they were paired with. The researchers collected all responses 
(offers and MAOs) on pen and paper questionnaires and distributed them to their 
counterparts.  
Participants were informed at the beginning of the study that one of the ten rounds 
would be chosen at random, and the participants would be paid on the basis of the outcome 
of that round. Whereas the hypothesis can be sufficiently tested with one round, we 
conducted 10 rounds to determine not only whether our hypothesized effects exist, but also 
how long they persist in the face of minimal amounts of feedback about peer respondents 
and outcomes (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996).  
                                                          
1 An additional variant of PUG in which the offer to the peer respondent was known had to be dropped 
because of printing errors in the instructions. Although the 60 participants in this variant of the game were 
told that they would know what the peer respondent had received before deciding their MAO, a document 
they read indicated that they would not receive this information, which confounded our intended 
manipulation and left the participants confused about the actual situation. As a result, we dropped all of these 
participants from this condition in our analysis. Data from the study are uploaded to an online appendix at 
Open Science Framework: http://bit.do/pug_osf. 
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Ultimately, there were 52 participants (26 respondents and 26 offerors) in the UG 
condition, 54 (36 respondents and 18 offerors) in the PUG unaware condition, and 60 (40 
respondents and 20 offerors) in the PUG aware condition. 
UG Condition  
Participants in the UG condition played the standard UG using the strategy method. 
There was an endowment of 500 INR2 to the offeror. The respondent indicates a minimum 
acceptable offer (MAO) between 0 INR to 500 INR, while the offeror proposes an offer 
between 0 INR to 500 INR. If the MAO is equal to or lesser than the offer, then the 
respondent receives the offer and the offeror receives the remaining. If the MAO is greater 
than the offer, then both parties receive nothing. This serves as our control condition. 
PUG Unaware Condition 
We use two variants of the PUG. In the PUG unaware condition, only the offerors 
knew that they were engaging with two respondents simultaneously. In other words, from 
the perspective of the respondent, there was no difference between PUG unaware and UG, 
but their behavior could differ because of potential differences in how the Offeror behaved 
in the two cases. In this condition, the respondents indicate their MAO (between 0 INR and 
500 INR) and the offeror proposes two offers (between 0 INR and 500 INR) simultaneously, 
one offer to each respondent. This variant served as our second control condition. 
PUG Aware Condition 
In this variant of the PUG, both respondents were aware that the offeror was 
simultaneously engaging another respondent. Similar to the previous condition, the 
respondents indicate their MAO (between 0 INR and 500 INR) and the offeror proposes 
                                                          
2 500 INR is equivalent to 25.31 USD according to purchasing power parity adjustments at the time of 
study 
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two offers (between 0 INR and 500 INR) simultaneously, one offer to each respondent. 
However, the respondents were not aware of the magnitude of the offer to the other 
respondent. This variant served as our main treatment condition of interest. After round 
one (the focus of our Hypothesis 1), in addition to own outcomes, participants were also 
aware whether the offer cleared between the offeror and the other respondent at the end of 
every round.  
Results and Discussion 
<Insert Figure 2 About Here> 
<Insert Table 2 About Here> 
Figure 2 shows the MAOs of the respondents in the three conditions across the ten 
rounds. The results of all mean comparisons are summarized in Table 2. In Round 1, there 
was no difference in the mean MAO between UG (M = 203, [141, 264]) and PUG unaware 
(M = 188, [140, 235]; p = .69, 95% CI [-91, 61]. In line with our prediction, the mean 
MAOs in PUG aware (M = 309, [260, 358]) were greater than the mean MAOs in PUG 
unaware (M = 188, [140, 235]; p < .01, 95% CI [55, 188]). We also found that the mean 
MAOs in PUG aware (M = 309, [260, 358]) were greater than the mean MAOs in UG (M 
= 203, [141, 264]; p = 0.01, 95% CI [29, 183]). This pattern of differences continued and 
remained statistically significant for Rounds 1 to 5. After Round 5, however, the difference 
in MAOs across the conditions was no longer significant at conventional levels (p = 0.12) 
(see Table 2). 
There was no difference in the offers made by the offerors across the UG, PUG 
unaware, and PUG aware conditions in any of the rounds. From the perspective of the 
offerors, they were always playing a series of materially unrelated UGs with a pair of agents. 
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This is also consistent with no differences between respondent’s behavior in PUG 
Unaware and UG. This evidence rules out any possibility that the offerors were hedging 
outcomes across respondents in PUG (relative to UG).  
Supplementary Results 
 We also conducted an online scenario study with participants on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk to replicate our findings in a different subject pool. Our results were 
consistent with the findings in support of Hypothesis 1 in Experiment 1. We found that 
respondents in PUG reported greater MAOs than respondents in the UG (refer to 
Supplementary Study 1 - Scenario Calibration Study for full details) 
Experiment 2 
In this experiment, we test H2 in a scenario (accepting or rejecting a hypothetical 
salary for a job offer) among a sample of business school students. We aim to test the 
empirical phenomenon of transparency versus secrecy in allocations. We chose this setting 
as our participants were seeking employment during the time of this study. This increases 
the face validity of the study to examine our phenomenon in the field in more naturalistic 
settings. 
Participants 
We recruited participants from a university in Singapore as part of their course 
requirements for research credits. We targeted 25 participants in each of our four conditions 
but realized 91 out of a target of 100 participants. Their average age was 22.1 years; 37 
were male, and 54 were female. 
Study Design 
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Participants completed the study online via the Qualtrics survey platform. Upon 
registration for the study, they received a link to the informed consent webpage. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (PUG Secrecy condition and 
PUG Transparent condition). Participants read a scenario asking them to imagine 
themselves receiving a job offer with a monthly salary of either $2,000 or $2,300 (two sub-
conditions) out of a maximum of $3,000 (see Appendix 2 for the full scenario). We chose 
these amounts keeping in mind the results from our reanalysis of data from Ho and Su 
(2009) indicating that equity effects were stronger for low absolute values of offers.  
Subsequently, participants were asked whether they would accept or reject the job 
offer. To focus on the effects of secrecy versus transparency, we examined whether the 
likelihood of acceptance of offers in PUG Transparent was greater when the offers to peers 
were known compared to when offers to peers were not known, for the same magnitude of 
an offer to self.  
Ultimately, there were 46 participants (26 female and 20 male, average age 22.02 
years) in the PUG Secrecy condition, and 45 (28 female and 17 male, average age 22.13 
years) in the PUG Transparent condition (see Appendix 4 for a detailed breakdown). 
PUG Secrecy Condition 
Participants read a scenario asking them to imagine themselves receiving a job offer 
with a monthly salary of either $2,000 or $2,300 (out of a maximum possible salary of 
$3,000). This range was intentionally designed to be on the lower end of the salary that 
recent graduates received. Participants were not informed of the salary that was offered to 
a peer candidate but were aware of the presence of the peer candidate who also received a 
job offer from the same organization for a similar position (see Appendix 2 for full scenario 
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text). After reading the scenario, participants were asked to indicate on a 5-point Likert 
scale how likely they will be to accept the job offer (1=definitely not to 5=definitely yes). 
PUG Transparency Condition 
Participants read a scenario asking them to imagine themselves receiving a job offer 
with a monthly salary of $2,000 or $2,300 (out of a maximum possible salary of $3,000). 
Participants were informed that an equal monthly salary was offered to a peer candidate 
from the same organization for a similar position (e.g., $2,000 to the focal participant, 
$2,000 to peer candidate). After reading the scenario, participants were asked to indicate 
on a 5-point Likert scale how likely they will be to accept the job offer (1=definitely not to 
5=definitely yes). 
Manipulation Check 
Participants were asked to indicate how transparent the company was in terms of 
salary offers to candidates (1=none at all to 5=a great deal). 
Results and Discussion 
The transparency manipulation was successful as participants in the transparent 
condition indicated higher mean levels of pay transparency (M = 3.29, [2.96, 3.62]) as 
compared to participants in the secrecy condition (M = 1.96, [1.67, 2.24]; p < .01, 95% CI 
[.90, 1.76]). 
First, we compared how likely participants were to accept offers in the transparency 
and secret conditions. As predicted in H2, we found that participants in the transparency 
condition reported a higher likelihood to accept the job offer (M = 3.40, [3.12, 3.68]) than 
participants in the secrecy condition (M = 2.93, [2.65, 3.22]; p = .02, 95% CI [0.07, 0.86]).  
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We found that across the lowest offer of $2,000, participants in the transparency 
condition reported a higher likelihood to accept (M = 3.25, [2.85, 3.65]) than participants 
in the secrecy condition (M = 2.58, [2.19, 2.98]; p = 0.02, 95% CI [0.12, 1.21]). However, 
at the higher offer amount of $2,300, there was no difference in acceptance rates between 
participants in the transparency condition (M = 3.57, [3.15, 3.99]) and those in the secrecy 
condition (M = 3.32, [2.92, 3.71]; p = .37, 95% CI [-0.31, 0.81]). This study provides 
support to our prediction that transparency, coupled with equal offers, would increase 
acceptance rates (see Table 3). The effect is stronger for lower offers, as we also found in 
the reanalysis of data from Ho and Su (2009). 
<Insert Table 3 About Here> 
Supplementary Results 
 We also tested H2 with the scenario version of the UG and PUG using the direct 
response method using participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We varied various 
offer amounts and asked participants to indicate if they would accept or reject the offers. 
Our results were consistent with the findings of Experiment 2. We found that across equal 
offers, the mean acceptance proportion in PUG Secrecy was lower than that in PUG 
Transparency. We also found that an offer of $0.01 out of a pot of $5.00 given 
simultaneously and visibly to two peers was accepted with a probability of nearly 36%, 
whereas in UG only 14% accepted it (see Supplementary Study 2 - PUG Scenario Study 
for full details).  
Experiment 3 
A key limitation of Experiment 2 is that we only had conditions of secrecy and 
transparency, which are the extremes of minimum uncertainty and maximum uncertainty 
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about offers to peers. There were no conditions with varying levels of uncertainty. A 
second limitation is that we only had conditions with equal pay to peers, but no conditions 
with unequal pay to peers. Therefore, we cannot definitively claim that the effect of 
transparency on own willingness to accept only occurs under equal offers- it might occur 
for unequal offers as well, though prior literature strongly indicates this is unlikely (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999).  
We therefore designed a comprehensive scenario study to address the limitations 
of Experiment 2. Using a sample of full-time employees, we aim to test the impact of 
varying levels of uncertainty in allocations while also manipulating (in)equity of 
allocations to peer respondents, as well as the level of allocation to self as we did before in 
Experiment 2. We improved upon the design of Experiment 2 by adding two new 
conditions of uncertainty to the paired ultimatum game paradigm, and an additional 
treatment of equal, lower, or higher offers to peers (manipulation of advantageous and 
disadvantageous inequity). This yielded a full factorial design of 4 x 2 x 3 (4 levels of 
uncertainty x 2 absolute levels of offer x 3 levels of (in)equity) with a total of 24 possible 
conditions. We omitted four of these conditions for logical reasons, because under full 
secrecy, inequity relative to a peer is undefined. See Table 4 for a summary description of 
the conditions. 
<Insert Table 4 About Here> 
Participants 
We recruited participants from Prolific, which is a panel based in the U.K that is 
established for recruitment of subjects for academic research. We targeted 50 participants 
for each of our twenty conditions and obtained 1,000 participants. Their average age was 
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36.3 years; 393 were male, and 607 were female. 982 were working full time, 12 were 
working part time, and 6 were not working at the time of response. All except 10 
participants were citizens of the United Kingdoms. Participants were paid 1.50 pounds for 
their time spent participating and this was not contingent on factors of the study design. 
Study Design 
Participants completed the study online via the Qualtrics survey platform. Upon 
registration for the study, they received a link to the informed consent webpage. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of twenty conditions after they provided 
their consent. 
Manipulations 
Uncertainty - We manipulated uncertainty by varying the degree of information 
about the offer amount to peer respondent in four different ways. First, in the full secrecy 
condition, similar to Experiment 2, participants had no information about the offer amount 
to peer respondent. Second, in the partial secrecy condition, participants had information 
on the past offers made by the offeror to past respondents, specifically whether the offers 
were equal or unequal. This created some uncertainty, as past behavior is not a perfect 
predictor of what the peer respondent will receive in the current setup. Third, in the risk 
condition, participants were given information about the exact range of possible offer 
amounts to peer respondent. Fourth, in the transparent condition, participants were given 
information about the exact offer amount to peer respondent (see Appendix 3 for the full 
scenario). 
Level of pay - In the high level of pay condition, participants received $3.00 offers 
(out of $5). In the low level of pay condition, participants received $1.50 offer (out of $5). 
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We chose these amounts keeping in mind the results from Experiment 2 and Supplementary 
Study 2 where we found significant differences between transparency and secrecy at lower 
absolute levels of offers.   
Inequity - In the equal condition, participants were given information that the offer 
amount made to peer respondents was equal. In the advantageous inequity condition, 
participants were given information that the offeror gave a lower offer amount to peer 
respondents. In the disadvantageous inequity condition, participants were given 
information that the offeror gave a higher offer amount to peer respondents. 
We did not collect data on four conditions (5, 9, 17, 21) in Table 4 as they were 
logically undefined. Under full secrecy, participants could not be given any information 
about the offer amount to peer respondent. Therefore, they could not be told whether the 
offer amount is equal, higher, or lower.  
Manipulation Checks 
Uncertainty - Participants reported their perceived uncertainty of the offer amount 
to peer respondents by responding to the following question “On a scale from 1 to 5, how 
uncertain are you about the offer amount made to Respondent-J?” (1=none at all to 5=a 
great deal). 
Inequity - Participants reported their perceived equality of the offer amount to peer 
respondent by responding to the following question “On a scale from 1 to 7, relative to the 
amount offered to you, how much do you think the amount offered to Respondent-J is?” 
(1=greatly lower to 7=greatly higher) 
Dependent variable 
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 Willingness to accept After reading the information about the scenario, participants 
reported their willingness to accept the offer on a 7-point Likert scale (1=not at all to 
7=Definitely).  
Mediator 
Fairness To test the mechanism of EDS, we asked respondents to report their 
perceived fairness of the amount offered to them on a 7-point Likert scale (1=extremely 
unfair to 7=extremely fair). The central process in EDS is an escalated perception of what 
is considered a fair allocation to oneself. Therefore, besides measuring willingness to 
accept, we also measure the participant’s subjective sense of fairness of an offer. To prevent 
demand effects, we asked these questions after the main dependent variable of willingness 
to accept. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks 
The uncertainty manipulation was successful as participants in the Full Secrecy 
conditions indicated higher mean levels of uncertainty than those in the other three 
conditions. The equality manipulation was also successful as participants in the 
Advantageous Inequity conditions indicated perceiving the offers to peer as lower than 
those in the other two conditions (see Table 5 for mean values). 
<Insert Table 5 About Here> 
Main Effects 
Table 6 reports the main aggregate effects of each orthogonally manipulated factor. 
In this segment, we report the results of each manipulation on willingness to accept.  
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Inequity Received theory and prior evidence suggest that inequity creates disutility 
and reduces willingness to accept. Disadvantageous inequity (i.e. receiving less than 
others) hurts; interestingly even advantageous inequity (i.e. receiving more than others) is 
less preferred to receiving the same (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Ho & Su, 2009). We replicated 
these in our study. We found that participants who received higher offers than peers 
(advantageous inequity condition; N=302, M=5.08, 95% CI [4.92, 5.24]) and participants 
who received lower offers than peers (disadvantageous inequity condition; N=299, 
M=4.49, 95% CI [4.32, 4.66]) reported lower willingness to accept than participants who 
received equal offers with peers (equal condition; N=300, M=5.50, 95% CI[5.38, 5.63]; 
equal vs. advantageous: p < 0.01, 95% CI [.23, .63]; equal vs. disadvantageous: p < 0.01, 
95% CI [.81, 1.22]). As expected, participants who received lower offers than peers 
reported the lowest willingness to accept (advantageous vs. disadvantageous: p < 0.01, 
95% CI [.36, .82]). Thus, our Experiment 3 confirms prior theoretical predictions and 
empirical evidence on the avoidance on inequity. 
Level of pay As was found in Experiment 2, and also in the data gathered by Ho 
and Su (2009), willingness to accept in general increases with the level of the offer, 
independent of any equity considerations. Participants who received a high offer (N=497, 
M=5.33, 95% CI reported greater willingness to accept than participants who received a 
low offer (N=503, M=4.72, 95% CI [4.60, 4.85]; p < 0.01, 95% CI [.43, .77]).  
Uncertainty There is no main effect of information uncertainty (Full Secrecy: 
N=99, M=5.03, 95% CI [4.74, 5.32]; Partial Secrecy: N=294, M=5.14, 95% CI [4.99, 
5.28]; Risk: N=302, M=4.96, 95% CI [4.80. 5.12]; Transparent: N=305, M=4.98 [4.81, 
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5.14]) on willingness to accept. This is expected because the effect of this manipulation is 
contingent on the other manipulations of inequity and level of pay.     
Hypothesis testing 
Table 4 summarizes the disaggregated mean scores for willingness to accept across 
all the 20 conditions. First, we seek to replicate the test for H2 that states willingness to 
accept an allocation increases in the presence of a peer who is known to be receiving an 
equal allocation, compared to the case where the allocation to the peer is secret. We 
conducted paired-sample t-tests to compare participants’ reported willingness to accept 
across the two uncertainty conditions of Full Secrecy and Transparent offers, for Equal 
offers. The dependent variable is Willingness to accept. For Low absolute offer amounts, 
we found that participants in Transparent (Condition 4: N=51, M=5.47, 95% CI [5.19, 
5.75]) reported a higher willingness to accept than participants in Full Secrecy (Condition 
1: N=51, M=4.53, 95% CI [4.11, 4.95]; p < .00, 95% CI [.45, 1.44]). Similar to the findings 
in Experiment 2, at the High absolute offer amount of $3.00, there were no differences in 
reported willingness to accept between participants in Full Secrecy (Condition 13: N=48, 
M=5.56, 95% CI [5.20, 5.92]) and participants in Transparent (Condition 16: N=51, 
M=5.76, 95% CI [5.52, 6.01]; p=.35). These results replicate our previous findings from 
Experiment 2, which found that transparency and equality of offers increased willingness 
to accept relative to secret offers, but only when the offer amount is low.  
At High level of pay to self across equal offers, there is no difference across the 
four different conditions of uncertainty (Full Secrecy condition 13: N=48, M=5.56, 95% 
CI [5.20, 5.92]; Partial Secrecy condition 14: N=49, M=5.76, 95% CI [5.44, 6.07]; Risk 
condition 15: N=49, M=5.82, 95% CI [5.54, 6.09]; Transparent condition 16: N=51, 
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M=5.76, 95% CI [5.52, 6.01]).  This is expected as equity considerations appear to be less 
salient at high absolute offer levels and participants are inclined to accept offers in general 
(Ho and Su, 2009). 
Additional Analysis 
Degree of uncertainty 
We investigated the impact of intermediate levels of uncertainty (i.e. Partial 
Secrecy and Risk) on willingness to accept for Equal offers at high and low levels of pay. 
At Low level of pay, we find that there is no statistically significant difference in reported 
willingness to accept between participants in the Risk condition (condition 3: N=51, 
M=5.41, 95% CI [5.11, 5.72]), where participants know the mean and variance of offers to 
peers, and participants in the Transparent condition (condition 4: N=51, M=5.47, 95% CI 
[5319, 5.75]; p = .77, 95% CI [-0.35, 0.47]). Similarly, there is no statistically significant 
difference in reported willingness to accept between participants in Partial Secrecy 
condition (condition 2: N=49, M=4.80, 95% CI [4.45, 5.14]) and participants in Full 
Secrecy condition (condition 1: N=51, M=4.53, 95% CI [4.11, 4.95]; p = .33, 95% CI [-
.27, .80]. However, reported willingness to accept by participants in Partial Secrecy 
(condition 2) is lower than those of participants in Transparency condition (Condition 4: 
N=51, M=5.47, 95% CI [5.19, 5.75]; p = .00, 95% CI [.24, 1.11]). This lends confidence 
that considering only the extreme points of uncertainty (Full Secrecy and Transparency) as 
we had done in Experiments 1 and 2 does not lead to misleading conclusions.  
Disadvantageous Inequity  
At low levels of pay and when participants received lower offers than peers 
(disadvantageous inequity), we find that participants in Transparent condition (condition 
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12: N= 50, M=3.88, 95% CI [3.43, 4.33]) reported lower willingness to accept than 
participants in Full Secrecy condition (condition 1: N=51, M=4.53, 95% CI [4.11, 4.95]; p 
= .04, 95% CI [-1.26, -.04]). Similarly, participants in the Risk condition (condition 11: 
N=51, M=3.88, 95% CI [3.47, 4.29]) also reported lower willingness to accept than 
participants in Full Secrecy condition (p = .03, 95% CI [-1.22, -.07]). There were no 
differences in reported willingness to accept between participants in Partial Secrecy 
condition (condition 10: N=49, M=4.96, 95% CI [4.65, 5.27]) and participants in Full 
Secrecy condition (p=.10).  
At high absolute levels of offers to self, when participants received lower offers 
than peers (disadvantageous inequity), participants in Transparent condition (condition 24: 
N=50, M=4.66, 95% CI [4.26, 5.06]) reported lower willingness to accept than participants 
in Full Secrecy condition (condition 13: N=48, M=5.56, 95% CI [5.20, 5.92]; p = .00, 95% 
CI [.37, 1.43]). Similarly, participants in Risk condition (condition 23: N=51, M=4.39, 95% 
CI [3.99, 4.79]) reported lower willingness to accept than participants in Full Secrecy 
condition (p = .00, 95% CI [.64, 1.70]). There was no difference in reported willingness to 
accept between participants in Partial Secrecy condition (condition 22: N=48, M=5.21, 
95% CI [4.82, 5.60]) and those in Full Secrecy condition. These results confirm prior 
theory that visible inequality can lower willingness to accept.  
Advantageous inequity Next, we compared the results across situations where 
participants received higher offers than peer (advantageous inequity). There were no 
differences between the conditions at low levels of pay (Partial Secrecy condition 6: N=48, 
M=4.77, 95% CI [4.42, 5.13], Risk condition 7: N=52, M=4.88, 95% CI [4.52, 5.24], 
Transparent condition 8: N=51, M=4.65, 95% CI [4.20, 5.09], Full Secrecy condition 1).  
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We run the same tests at high absolute levels of offers to self in situations where 
participants received higher offers than peers (advantageous inequity). There were no 
differences between the reported willingness to accept among participants in conditions 
with varying levels of uncertainty (Transparent condition 20: N=52, M=5.40, 95% CI 
[4.99, 5.82]; Risk condition 19: N=48, M=5.44, 95% CI [5.03, 8.84]; Partial Secrecy 
condition 18: N=51, M=5.31, 95% CI [4.96, 5.67]) and the Full Secrecy condition 
(condition 13). Received theory indicates that the effects of advantageous inequity should 
be weaker than those of disadvantageous inequity (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Fershtman et al, 
2012), and our results confirm that.   
Mediation testing 
To test the mechanism of EDS by determining whether fairness mediates the effect 
of uncertainty on willingness to accept, we conducted a bootstrapped indirect effect 
analysis in STATA for Conditions 1 (Full Secrecy-Low-Equal) and 4 (Transparent-Low-
Equal). We set uncertainty as a binary variable, where 1=full secrecy and 0=transparent. 
Uncertainty negatively predicts willingness to accept (B= -.94, SE=.25, p<.01, 95% CI 
[.45, 1.44]) and perceived fairness (B=-1.84, SE=.26, p<.01, 95% CI [1.33, 2.36]), while 
perceived fairness was a positive predictor of willingness to accept (B=.30, SE=.09, p<.01, 
95% CI [.12, .48]). However, with perceived fairness added as a predictor, the effect of 
uncertainty on willingness to accept was no longer statistically significant (B= -.38, 
SE=.29, p=.19, 95% CI [-.96, .20]. The indirect effect of uncertainty on willingness to 
accept through perceived fairness was significant, indirect effect = -.56, SE = .22, 95% CI 
= [-.98, -.14] (see Figure 3). This provides evidence that the effect of uncertainty on 
willingness to accept is mediated by perceptions of fairness, thus suggesting that 
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participants perceived less fairness when offers were secret, which consequently reduced 
their willingness to accept.  
<Insert Figure 3 About Here> 
<Insert Table 7 About Here> 
General Discussion 
We find robust evidence to suggest that the mere presence of a peer, without any 
additional information regarding allocations to that peer, is sufficient to trigger concerns 
about inequity and inflate perceptions of what one deserves (i.e. EDS), relative to situations 
in which no peer is present (Hypothesis 1). Our explicit comparison of the minimum 
acceptable offers participants report, with random assignment into the ultimatum games 
and paired ultimatum games offers the most persuasive evidence to date that implicit peer 
comparison influences considerations of the equity of offers made to oneself. Our results 
show that secrecy may not protect organizations from the adverse consequences of such 
comparison. 
Transparency differs from secrecy in two ways – a) transparency reveals what 
others get and b) whether what others get is higher or lower than what the self has received. 
Secrecy reveals neither, and yet produces a systematic escalation in the perception of one’s 
own deservingness because of the asymmetry in utility from receiving more versus less 
than a peer. This may occur with or without an upward bias in estimating what others are 
receiving, with an upward bias further strengthening the effect. Thus, uncertainty that 
accompanies pay secrecy can impose costs on the organization in the form of escalating 
beliefs of deservingness.   
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The implication of our analysis is a new boundary condition on when secrecy 
should be applied: as long as the perception of what is a fair allocation for self, when peers 
receive offers secretly, is smaller than the actual offer to peers.  Transparency in such a 
situation would only escalate perceptions of what is a fair offer to self even further, to the 
disadvantage of the offeror. To illustrate this, suppose a hierarchical superior has two 
subordinates, ego and alter. The superior wants to pay alter an amount of 100. When the 
offer to alter is unknown to ego, EDS may occur and lead ego to come to expect an 
amount X.  If X<100, then the designer should maintain secrecy and pay ego and alter X 
and 100 respectively. However, if X>100, then the designer is better off paying both ego 
and alter 100 and disclose the payments made to ego and alter to each other, since 200< 
X+100. In practice, transparency can be achieved by sharing information about pay ranges 
or the pay distribution, and these can reduce the costs imposed by EDS otherwise.  
We also offer some thoughts on how to calibrate EDS. In an additional scenario 
study using the paired ultimatum game (PUG), we found that under secrecy, elicited 
minimum acceptable offers (MAOs) are approximately equal to MAOs under transparency 
where peers are offered $3 out of $5 (see Supplementary Study 3 in supplementary 
materials for more information). Specifically, participants indicated a MAO of M=2.51 
when offer to peer was secret, which is almost equivalent to what participants indicated 
(M=2.68) when they knew that an offer of $3 out of $5 was made to a peer. However, when 
participants knew that offers to peer was lower ($1.50 out of $5, $.01 out of $5), their 
reported MAO was much lower (M=1.90, M=1.61 respectively). Consequently, in this 
experiment, if the offer to peers is in fact lower than approximately 60% ($3 out of $5) of 
the available sum of money, then keeping that offer secret is harmful to the offeror’s 
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interest. Making the equivalent offer to peers transparent will reduce the minimum 
acceptable amount from participants. Conversely, at the highest offer level of 
approximately 90% of the pot ($4.50 out of $5.00), unsurprisingly, participants reported 
higher MAOs than those participants who did not know the offers peer. Such an approach 
to calibration may help determine the threshold (60% in this example) below which offers 
to peers should be public.  
When allocations to peers are unknown, the escalation of deservingness perceptions 
among subordinates may also force superiors to adopt compromise options. From the 
perspective of superiors, EDS among subordinates may manifest as an implicit cartel that 
forms without communication, with all members of that cartel ratcheting up their 
perceptions of what is a fair allocation to self, thus increasing the cost to the organization. 
In fact, if there is a constraint on resources leading to subordinates demanding more than 
what they think a peer will demand, then a publicly declared equal allocation to all 
subordinates might help the organization to resist inflationary pressure. This is a possible 
explanation for the widely reported phenomenon of corporate socialism, that is, of the equal 
allocation of resources to divisions by multidivisional corporations (Rajan, Servaes & 
Zingales, 2000). 
Our results also suggest the intriguing possibility that inevitable comparisons with 
peers can be used to the advantage of the organization (Hypothesis 2). We found that 
transparent allocations to peers not only mitigate the inflation of perceptions of what a fair 
allocation to oneself is relative to the situation in which these allocations are secret, but 
that transparent and equitable offers actually deflate perceptions of what a fair allocation 
to self is (Experiments 2 & 3). Indeed, numerous studies on UG suggest that offers less 
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than 20% are overwhelmingly rejected (Camerer, 2003), whereas we find that even such 
offers are highly likely to be accepted if a peer is transparently seen to receive the same.   
Our study is the first to directly test and provide evidence for this surprising but inescapable 
corollary to the premise that individuals derive at least some utility from equal offers to 
peers independent of the utility they derive from the material properties of the offer itself. 
Decreasing the variance of offers to subordinates may thus enable a superior to also reduce 
the mean value of those offers.  
In other words, satisfying peer-related equity concerns in a visible manner (and 
doing so for the correct set of relevant peers) may actually allow a manager to get away 
with more inequitable behavior toward a subordinate, relative to a situation in which there 
is no peer. The implication is that an effective organizational design may be the clustering 
of employees who will be paid the same amount, not only to lower the costs of envy 
(Nickerson & Zenger, 2008) but also to allow the organization to pay them less in 
aggregate. More generally, our results suggest that organizations must consider the trade-
off between the benefits of optimal but unequal allocations versus the benefits of 
transparent and equal allocations rather than automatically assume that secrecy resolves 
the fairness concerns created by unequal allocations (also see Card et al., 2012).  
Taken together, the observations of this paper suggest that equity and transparency 
may be complements from the perspective of the organization. The value of making 
transparent offers to subordinates and their peers increases when those offers are equitable 
(and decreases when they are inequitable). Conversely, the value of making equitable 
offers to subordinates increases when those offers are transparent, whereas opaque offers, 
even when equitable, are likely to lead to an escalation of deservingness under secrecy 
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(EDS).  Conversely, when the variance in pay is sufficiently large so that transparency 
increases the wage bill for the firm far more through pressures towards equality than the 
costs of secrecy we have indicated, then clearly secrecy is to be preferred (failing which 
wage compression may be necessary; see Nickerson and Zenger, 2008). 
Even for a given position with the same set of job responsibilities, organizational 
members seldom receive identical levels of compensation. This is due to heterogeneity in 
ability and expected performance, which may result in inequality that nonetheless appears 
as inequity to recipients (Larkin et al, 2012; Lee and Puranam, 2017). From an 
organizational designer’s perspective, if significant inequity in pay is unavoidable then it 
is best to keep that difference secret.  However, when pay differences are small, the secrecy 
may be counterproductive as all agents escalate their expectations of what the others are 
being paid upwards, which may be higher than the actual pay differences. Furthermore, 
when pay levels are uniformly ‘high’ in an organization, transparency or secrecy do not 
matter. Given that pay is unlikely to be uniformly high, organizational designers need to 
pay attention to the levels of inequality when making a choice between secrecy and 
disclosure.        
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Our studies focused directly on manipulating the absence and presence of a peer, 
and the secrecy versus transparency of offer amounts to peers. One major limitation of our 
studies in extrapolating to salary situations at the workplace is that we did not account for 
effort or performance. Visible effort and relative performance are vital components 
influencing equity considerations in organizations for any given degree of inequality, and 
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we abstracted away from these to a setting where inequality is the same as inequity.  
Relatedly, we have not incorporated individual heterogeneity in ability that may influence 
perceptions of what is a fair allocation to oneself and peers. Translating the inisghts from 
our research to the field will require a careful consideration of these complications.  
Mismatches in perceptions of what is a fair offer to self can take time to adjust 
(Experiment 1). It may be tempting to draw the conclusion that five identical interactions 
(the number it took to push the MAOs closer to UG in Experiment 1) suffice for such 
adjustment to take place, and therefore that the peer presence-induced ratcheting up of 
perceptions of what is a fair allocation to self may be a transient phenomenon. However, 
that conclusion would be premature. In the experiment, these interactions were five of the 
ten that participants knew would occur. In practice, the number of interactions is not known 
in advance, and they are in any case unlikely to be identical. Rather, our results suggest 
that there is a tendency to ratchet up perceptions of what is a fair offer to oneself through 
EDS, though learning through repeated interactions may help to curb this inflation. In this 
paper, we did not investigate the effects of repeated interactions leading to learning. Future 
studies could consider repeated interactions and integrate a learning model with the EDS 
mechanism. Without a significant digression into learning models, it would be hard to do 
justice to the phenomenon of “learning what is fair”.  
Conclusion 
 Much of organizational life occurs in the shadow of hierarchy and in the presence 
of peers. This implies that considerations of equity arise in both vertical and lateral 
directions. For a variety of reasons, it has been argued that rewards to other subordinates 
be kept a secret by a hierarchical superior, lest transparency harms the social cohesion 
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within an organization by revealing inequality. In this paper, we argue and find support for 
a mechanism that causes an escalation of perceptions of deservingness of an allocation to 
self (EDS) under secrecy and thus demands a more careful consideration of the conditions 
under which secrecy is a good policy. An important corollary of EDS is that when rewards 
to peers are transparent and seen to be equitable relative to what one is receiving, then 
lower rewards may be palatable to all than was the case when the rewards to peers were 
kept secret. The EDS mechanism not only suggests further theoretical and empirical 
research but also informs organization design thinking in terms of how to create reference 
groups through grouping. 
 36 
 
 
References 
 
Adams, J. S. (1965) Inequity in social exchange. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 2, 267-299. 
Agarwal, R., Anand, J., Bercovitz, J., & Croson, R. (2012). Spillovers across organizational 
architectures: The role of prior resource allocation and communication in post‐
acquisition coordination outcomes. Strategic Management Journal, 33(6), 710-733. 
Bamberger, P., & Belogolovsky, E. (2010). The impact of pay secrecy on individual task 
performance. Personnel Psychology, 63(4), 965-996. 
Bamberger, P., & Belogolovsky, E. (2017). The dark side of transparency: How and when 
pay administration practices affect employee helping. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 102(4), 658-671. 
Bahry, D. L., & Wilson, R. K. (2006). Confusion or fairness in the field? Rejections in the 
ultimatum game under the strategy method. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 60(1), 37-54. 
Belogolovsky, E., & Bamberger, P. (2014) Signalling in secret: Pay for performance and 
the incentive and sorting effects of pay secrecy. Academy of Management Journal, 
57(6), 1706-1733. 
Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2011). The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first 
survey of experimental comparisons. Experimental Economics, 14(3), 375-398. 
Burton, R. M., & Obel, B. (1988). Opportunism, incentives, and the M-form hypothesis: A 
laboratory study. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 10(1), 99-119. 
Camerer, C. (2003) Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. 
Princeton University Press. 
 37 
 
 
Card, D., Mas, A., Moretti, E., & Saez, E. (2012). Inequality at work: The effect of peer 
salaries on job satisfaction. American Economic Review, 102(6), 2981-3003. 
Colella, A., Paetzold, R. L., Zardkoohi, A., & Wesson, M. J. (2007). Exposing pay secrecy. 
Academy of Management Review, 32(1), 55-71. 
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ, 2. 
Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817-868. 
Fershtman, C., Gneezy, U., & List, J. A. (2012) Equity aversion: Social norms and the 
desire to be ahead. American Economics Journal: Microeconomics, 4(4), 131-144. 
Festinger, L. (1954) A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7(2), 117-
140. 
Fliessbach, K., Phillipps, C. B., Trautner, P., Schnabel, M., Elger, C. E., Falk, A., & Weber, 
B. (2012). Neural responses to advantageous and disadvantageous inequity. 
Frontiers in human neuroscience, 6, 165. 
Gartenberg, C., & Wulf, J. (2017). Pay harmony? Social comparison and performance 
compensation in multibusiness firms. Organization Science, 28(1), 39-55. 
Gely R, Bierman L (2003) Pay secrecy/confidentiality rules and the National Labor 
Relations Act. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law, 
6, 121-156. 
Guetzkow, H., & Simon, H. A. (1955). The impact of certain communication nets upon 
organization and performance in task-oriented groups. Management science, 1(3-
4), 233-250. 
 38 
 
 
Haran, U., & Ritov, I. (2014) Know who you’re up against: Counterpart identifiability 
enhances competitive behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 54, 
115-121. 
Ho, T. H., & Su, X. (2009) Peer-induced fairness in games. The American Economic 
Review, 99(5), 2022-2049. 
John, L. K., Loewenstein, G., & Rick, S. I. (2014). Cheating more for less: Upward social 
comparisons motivate the poorly compensated to cheat. Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes, 123(2), 101-109. 
Lanaj, K., Hollenbeck, J. R., Ilgen, D. R., Barnes, C. M., & Harmon, S. J. (2013). The 
double-edged sword of decentralized planning in multiteam systems. Academy of 
Management Journal, 56(3), 735-757. 
Larkin, I., Pierce, L., & Gino, F. (2012). The psychological costs of pay‐for‐performance: 
Implications for the strategic compensation of employees. Strategic Management 
Journal, 33(10), 1194-1214. 
Lawler, E. E. (1965). Managers ‘Perceptions of their Subordinates' Pay and of Their 
Superiors’ Pay. Personnel Psychology, 18(4), 413-422.  
Lee, S., & Puranam, P. (2017). Incentive Redesign and Collaboration in Organizations: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment. Strategic Management Journal, 38(12), 
2333–2352. 
Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2002). The effects of contracts on interpersonal trust. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(3), 534-559. 
 39 
 
 
Martin, J. (1982). The fairness of earnings differentials: An experimental study of the 
perceptions of blue-collar workers. The Journal of Human Resources, 17(1), 110-
122.  
Mitzkewitz, M., & Nagel, R. (1993). Experimental results on ultimatum games with 
incomplete information. International Journal of Game Theory, 22(2), 171-198. 
Moore, D. A., & Healy, P. J. (2008). The trouble with overconfidence. Psychological 
review, 115(2), 502. 
Nickerson, J. A., & Zenger, T. R. (2008). Envy, comparison costs, and the economic theory 
of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 29(13), 1429-1449.  
Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., & Van De Kuilen, G. (2004). Cultural differences in ultimatum 
game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis. Experimental economics, 7(2), 
171-188.  
Pillutla, M. M., & Murnighan, J. K. (1996). Unfairness, anger, and spite: Emotional 
rejections of ultimatum offers. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 68(3), 208-224. 
Rajan, R., Servaes, H., & Zingales, L. (2000). The cost of diversity: The diversification 
discount and inefficient investment. The Journal of Finance, 55(1), 35-80. 
Raveendran, M., Puranam, P., & Warglien, M. (2015). Object salience in the division of 
labor: Experimental evidence. Management Science, 62(7), 2110-2128. 
Reitzig, M., & Maciejovsky, B. (2015). Corporate hierarchy and vertical information flow 
inside the firm—a behavioral view. Strategic Management Journal, 36(13), 1979-
1999. 
 40 
 
 
Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). The 
neural basis of economic decision-making in the ultimatum 
game. Science, 300(5626), 1755-1758.  
Solnick, S. J., & Schweitzer, M. E. (1999). The influence of physical attractiveness and 
gender on ultimatum game decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 79(3), 199-215. 
Tremblay, M., & Chênevert, D. (2008). Influence of compensation strategies in Canadian 
technology-intensive firms on organizational and human resources 
performance. Group & Organization Management, 33(3), 269-302. 
Tricomi, E., Rangel, A., Camerer, C. F., & O’Doherty, J. P. (2010). Neural evidence for 
inequality-averse social preferences. Nature, 463(7284), 1089-1092. 
Wang, C. S., Sivanathan, N., Narayanan, J., Ganegoda, D. B., Bauer, M., Bodenhausen, G. 
V., & Murnighan, K. (2011). Retribution and emotional regulation: The effects of 
time delay in angry economic interactions. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 116(1), 46-54.  
Zenger, T. R. (1994). Explaining organizational diseconomies of scale in R&D: Agency 
problems and the allocation of engineering talent, ideas, and effort by firm 
size. Management science, 40(6), 708-729.  
 41 
 
 
Table 1: Roadmap of Experimental Approaches 
Study Method DV Purpose 
Experiment 1 
10 round (paired) ultimatum 
game 
Strategy 
Method: 
MAO 
Investigate effect of 
knowledge of presence 
of peer on MAO 
Experiment 2 Job offer scenario 
Willingness 
to accept job 
offer 
Investigate effect of 
transparency on 
willingness to accept 
equal offers to peers  
Experiment 3 
1 shot (paired) ultimatum 
game 
 
Willingness 
to accept 
offer 
Investigate effect of 
transparency on 
willingness to accept 
offers to peers at varying 
levels of inequity and 
uncertainty 
Supplementary Study 1 - 
Scenario Calibration 
Study 
1 shot (paired) ultimatum 
game 
Strategy 
Method: 
MAO 
Replicate findings of 
Experiment 1 on 
different sample 
(Investigate effect of 
knowledge of presence 
of peer on MAO)  
Supplementary Study 2 - 
PUG Scenario Study 
(Paired) Ultimatum Game; 
each participant shown four 
offers in different order: 
$0.01, $1.50, $3.00, $4.50 
out of $5 pot 
Accept / 
Reject Offer 
Investigate effect of 
transparency on 
acceptance levels of 
equal offers to peers 
Supplementary Study 3 
(Paired) Ultimatum Game; 
each participant informed 
that offeror made an offer of 
($0.01/$1.50/$3.00/$4.50 out 
of $5 pot) to peer  
Strategy 
Method: 
MAO 
Investigate effect of 
transparency of offer to 
peer on MAO 
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Table 2: Experiment 1 Results. MAO across rounds with respondent1 and respondent2 
pooled (Amounts in INR) 
Condition 
Mean MAO 
with 95% CI 
Difference 
in mean 
MAO 
95% CI of 
Difference in 
mean MAO p-value 
            
Round 1         
  PUG Aware (a) 309 [260, 358]       
  PUG Unaware (b) 188 [140, 235]       
  UG (c) 203 [141, 264]       
  
 
(a)-(b)   122 [55, 188] .00 
  (a)-(c)   106 [29, 183] .01 
  (b)-(c)   -15 [-91, 61] .69 
 
Round 1-5         
  PUG Aware (a) 253 [231, 276]       
  PUG Unaware (b) 188 [167, 208]       
  UG (c) 191 [168, 213]       
  
 
(a)-(b)   65 [35, 96] .00 
  (a)-(c)   63 [31, 94] .00 
  (b)-(c)   -3 [-33, 27] .86 
 
Round 6-10         
  PUG Aware (a) 211 [187, 235]       
  PUG Unaware (b) 183 [162, 204]       
  UG (c) 185 [163, 207]       
  
 
(a)-(b)   28 [-4, 60] .09 
  (a)-(c)   26 [-6, 58] .12 
  (b)-(c)   -2 [-32, 28] .90 
 
Round 10         
  PUG Aware (a) 208 [151, 266]       
  PUG Unaware (b) 185 [162, 204]       
  UG (c) 171 [117, 225]       
  
 
(a)-(b)   23 [-53, 99] .54 
  (a)-(c)   37 [-39, 115] .33 
  (b)-(c)   14 [-59, 87] .70 
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Table 3: Experiment 2 Results. Mean scores of Likelihood of Acceptance across 
Conditions and Offer Levels 
 
 PUG Secrecy PUG Transparency Difference 
$2,000 Salary 
Offer 
M = 2.58, [2.19, 2.98] M = 3.25, [2.85, 3.65] Δ = 0.67, p = 0.02, 
[0.12, 1.21] 
$2,300 Salary 
Offer 
M = 3.32, [2.92, 3.71]  
 
M = 3.57, [3.15, 3.99] Δ = 0.25, p = .37, [-
0.31, 0.81] 
Combined M = 2.93, [2.65, 3.22] 
 
M = 3.40, [3.12, 3.68]) Δ = 0.47, p = .02, 
[0.07, 0.86] 
 95% Confidence Intervals are in parentheses 
 
  
 44 
 
 
Table 4: Experiment 3 Conditions. Summary of experimental conditions and with 
Mean scores of Willingness to Accept. 
 
Condition Uncertainty Level 
of Pay 
to Self 
Inequity N Mean SD Variance 
1 Full Secrecy Low Equal 51 4.53 1.49 2.21 
2 Partial 
Secrecy 
Low Equal 49 4.80 1.19 1.42 
3 Risk Low Equal 51 5.41 1.08 1.17 
4 Transparent Low Equal 51 5.47 0.99 0.97 
5 Full Secrecy Low Advantageous 
Inequity 
- - - - 
6 Partial 
Secrecy 
Low Advantageous 
Inequity 
48 4.77 1.22 1.50 
7 Risk Low Advantageous 
Inequity 
52 4.88 1.29 1.67 
8 Transparent Low Advantageous 
Inequity 
51 4.65 1.59 2.51 
9 Full Secrecy Low Disadvantageous 
Inequity 
- - - - 
10 Partial 
Secrecy 
Low Disadvantageous 
Inequity 
49 4.96 1.08 1.16 
11 Risk Low Disadvantageous 
Inequity 
51 3.88 1.45 2.11 
12 Transparent Low Disadvantageous 
Inequity 
50 3.88 1.60 2.56 
13 Full Secrecy High Equal 48 5.56 1.24 1.53 
14 Partial 
Secrecy 
High Equal 49 5.76 1.09 1.19 
15 Risk High Equal 49 5.82 0.95 0.90 
16 Transparent High Equal 51 5.76 0.89 0.78 
17 Full Secrecy High Advantageous 
Inequity 
- - - - 
18 Partial 
Secrecy 
High Advantageous 
Inequity 
51 5.31 1.27 1.62 
19 Risk High Advantageous 
Inequity 
48 5.44 1.40 1.95 
20 Transparent High Advantageous 
Inequity 
52 5.40 1.49 2.21 
21 Full Secrecy High Disadvantageous 
Inequity 
- - - - 
22 Partial 
Secrecy 
High Disadvantageous 
Inequity 
48 5.21 1.35 1.83 
23 Risk High Disadvantageous 
Inequity 
51 4.39 1.42 2.00 
24 Transparent High Disadvantageous 
Inequity 
50 4.66 1.41 1.98 
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Table 5: Experiment 3 Manipulation Checks. Mean scores of Perceived Uncertainty 
and Perceived Inequity of Offers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Experiment 3 Results. Mean scores of Willingness to Accept across 
Manipulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Condition N Mean SD Variance 
Uncertainty (1=none at all to 5=a great deal) 
Full Secrecy 99 3.59 [3.36, 3.81] 1.13 1.29 
Partial Secrecy 294 3.09 [2.95, 3.22] 1.19 1.41 
Risk 302 2.58 [2.48, 2.68] 0.87 0.76 
Transparent 305 2.35 [2.24, 2.46] 1.00 1.00 
 
Inequity (1=greatly lower to 7=greatly higher) 
Equal 300 4.18 [4.10, 4.27] 0.73 0.53 
Advantageous 
Inequity 
302 3.54 [3.38, 3.71] 1.45 2.09 
Disadvantageous 
Inequity 
299 4.92 [4.78, 5.07] 1.27 1.62 
Manipulations N Mean SD Variance 
Uncertainty 
Full Secrecy 99 5.03 [4.74, 5.32] 1.46 2.13 
Partial Secrecy 294 5.14 [4.99, 5.28] 1.24 1.54 
Risk 302 4.96 [4.80, 5.12] 1.43 2.05 
Transparent 305 4.98 [4.81, 5.14] 1.49 2.21 
 
Level of Pay 
High 497 5.33 [5.21, 5.45] 1.33 1.78 
Low 503 4.72 [4.60, 4.85] 1.40 1.96 
 
Inequity 
Equal 300 5.50 [5.38, 5.63] 1.08 1.17 
Advantageous 
Inequity 
302 5.08 [4.92, 5.24] 1.41 1.98 
Disadvantageous 
Inequity 
299 4.49 [4.32, 4.66] 1.47 2.16 
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Table 7: Experiment 3 Results. Mean scores of Willingness to Accept across 
Conditions 
 
Condition Uncertainty Level 
of Pay 
to Self 
Inequity Mean 95% CI of 
Difference 
in mean 
p-
value 
1  Full Secrecy Low Equal 4.53 [4.11, 4.95]   
2 Partial 
Secrecy 
Low Equal 4.80 [4.46, 5.13]   
3 Risk Low Equal 5.41 [5.11, 5.71]   
4 Transparent Low Equal 5.47 [5.20, 5.74]   
 4 – 1 (Test of H2)  [.45, 1.44] .00 
 4 – 2  [.24, 1.11] .00 
 4 – 3   [-.35, .47] .77 
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Figure 1: Experimental Paradigm of UG and PUG 
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Figure 2: Experiment 1 Mean MAO across Conditions 
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Figure 3. Illustration of the mediation model identified in Experiment 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: † p < .10, * p < .05, and ** p < .01 (two-tailed).  
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